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1. In tr o d u c tio n
After the prolonged W ars of Independence, Venezuela formed 
part of the Republic of Colombia. Aside from the political diffi­
culties implicit in the union w ith Colombia and Ecuador, eco­
nomic motives played an im portant role in the dissolution of 
the Republic.1 Venezuela became a sovereign nation in 1830, 
but its economic progress was m arred by a financial problem 
which would not be resolved for a hundred years: the national 
debt. The object of this essay is to dem onstrate how and why 
th a t debt grew to unm anageable proportions.
Throughout the years 1830 to 1870 the practice of political 
exclusivity, whereby the governing group tightly defined itself 
and excluded a significant num ber of persons of like degree 
from participation, made the government vulnerable to armed 
rebellion. As the nation became increasingly indebted, thanks 
to w ar-related expenditures the short-term  m echanisms for fi­
nancing th a t indebtedness had the effect of increasing it and 
opening the door to financial speculation or agiotismo. The po­
litical legitimacy of the respective governments declined even 
more as a result. A civil w ar began in 1859 and lasted for n ear­
1 An excellent study of the  fiscal and economic situation in the  Republic of Colombia 
can be found in  Bushnell (1985: chaps. 6-10). A contem porary account of the  problems 
in Venezuela a t the  tim e can be found in the subsequently published correspondence 
of the  then  T reasury M inister, José Rafael Revenga (1953).
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ly five years; peace was never completely restored during the 
rest of the period. In this context, purely economic or financial 
calculations as to the probability of punctually m eeting public 
debt obligations lacked a vital component: the degree of politi­
cal legitimacy of the government. Each te st of th a t legitimacy 
using violent m eans not only caused extraordinary expendi­
tures but also disrupted the punctual servicing of the debt, as 
the governm ent used w hatever funds it had a t hand to preserve 
itself. This essay will outline the evolution of the public debt 
w ithin this political context, analyzing the factors which con­
tributed to its growth and evaluating government strategies to 
deal w ith it.2
It should be made clear th a t "government" strategy refers 
basically to the positions, policies and acts of the executive 
branch of the government. Besides the President and the Vice- 
President, th is included the three Secretaries (Interior and Ju s­
tice, W ar and Navy, and Treasury) and the five other members 
of the Government Council.3 Although Congress considered as­
pects of public credit, approved the term s of some fiscal tran s­
actions and certainly passed credit laws, it proved to be curi­
ously indolent w ith respect to the public debt and frequently
2 There are no studies dedicated to the  finances of th is period although Tomás Enrique 
Carrillo B atalla  (1984 ss.) has w ritten  ra th e r superficial introductory essays for some 
of the  volumes in his m onum ental reference work Historia de las F inanzas Públicas 
en Venezuela. I t basically contains selections from the m aterial published in the 
annual reports of the  M inisters of the  T reasury (Hacienda) and Public Credit, laws 
and decrees, and other related m aterial printed in the press or as pam phlets. The 
best studies of the  period w ith an economic orientation are found in Política y  Econo­
mia en Venezuela (Izard et al. 1976). Although concerned prim arily with commercial 
capital, the  first three sections of Banko's book shed a great deal of light on the  prob­
lems of credit in the  early period (Banko 1990: chaps. 1-11). Violence in all its m ani­
festations between 1840 and 1858 has been studied, with one chapter dedicated to so­
cial-political uprisings and another to m ilitary-political rebellion (M atthews 1977: 
chaps. 5-6). For the  m ilitary, see Gilmore (1964).
3 Foreign Affairs existed as a separate entity  but was assigned to other ministries, 
usually T reasury but sometimes to Interior. It became a separately constituted m inis­
try  in 1851. In 1863 the  M inistry of Development (Fomento) was created and th a t of 
Public C redit was created in 1864. It had existed as a section of the  T reasury Mini­
stry  since 1837. Congress nam ed four of the  other members of the  Council and the 
Suprem e Court nam ed the fifth. The Council was modified after 1861 but kept its ad­
visory functions.
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resorted to empowering the executive to make w hatever a r­
rangem ents it thought advisable.4 Even when Congress legis­
lated, it was usually the executive branch which proposed the 
policy and, of course, applied it.
2. T h e E v o lu tio n  o f  th e  D ebt: C rea tin g  th e  A d m in istr a ­
t iv e  S tr u c tu r e , 1830-1846
The new nation of Venezuela was conceived w ithin a markedly 
liberal economic framework and w ith few pretensions. While 
its essential adm inistrative and fiscal framework resembled 
the structures created by the Congress of Cúcuta in 1821, Ven­
ezuela did not have the territory  or the population which had 
allowed Bolivar his dream s of an in ternational role based on 
the resources of a united Colombia. As Diego U rbaneja writes, 
Venezuela in this period aspired only to "the level of progress 
compatible w ith our condition" (Urbaneja 1988: 100).
Conscious of the im portance of the agricultural sector, which 
produced almost all the national wealth, the governm ent fa­
vored it indirectly by abolishing the taxes which weighed most 
heavily upon it. The alcabala was abolished on June 13, 1831, 
the tobacco monopoly was disbanded on March 22, 1833, diez­
mos were abolished on April 6, 1833, and the export tax  was 
elim inated on M arch 31, 1841. The government's m ain function 
was to provide the minimum adm inistrative-bureaucratic 
structures which a self-respecting new nation required. I t was 
conscious of the need for economic progress and considered 
th a t th is could best be achieved through the stim ulation of 
three essential factors. The first was immigration, which would 
provide more workers for the agricultural sector and perhaps
4 See, for example, the  resolution of April 30, 1853, and the decrees of Septem ber 20, 
1856, and Jan u a ry  15, 1859. All Congressional laws and decrees can be found, by 
date, in  Recopilación de leyes de Venezuela (1982), a facsimile rep rin t of the  original 
Recopilación de leyes y  decretos. Unless otherwise specified, laws will simply be cited 
by the  date of the  ejecútese, as is required by law (March 21, 1833).
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attrac t the technical abilities which were almost totally lack­
ing. The second was the construction and improvement of 
transporta tion  routes, particularly  roads, which would lower 
the trem endously high costs of transporting agricultural goods 
to m arket. The th ird  was the attraction of foreign capital nec­
essary for any significant investm ent and, to a certain extent, 
necessary simply to facilitate current commercial transactions. 
W ith these elem ents in mind the executive branch proposed leg­
islation, subsequently approved by Congress, in each of the 
three areas.
Despite the promulgation of four different im m igration laws 
between 1831 and 1845, government-aided im m igration totalled 
only 11,851 persons and the government was often in arrears 
w ith the entrepreneurs who had contracted and transported 
the im m igrants (Berglund 1982). The government's initial re­
sponse to the need to improve transportation  routes was to 
assign the responsibility to the provinces, which were never 
able to accum ulate the necessary funds. In 1842 the provincial 
legislatures finally convinced the national government to set 
aside 160.000 pesos per year for th a t purpose. As a result, the 
first road between the capital, Caracas, and its port, La Guaira, 
was opened in 1845 and a w harf and breakw ater were put into 
service in the port in 1846. These two activities alone con­
sumed alm ost all the funds appropriated for such purposes in 
the entire nation during those years (P lanchart 1979: 168-177).
A ttracting foreign capital, while based in part on the suc­
cessful im plem entation of m easures to increase the population 
and facilitate the movement of goods, was basically predicated 
on removing the legal restrictions on property rights and estab­
lishing and m aintaining the credit of the nation. On April 10, 
1834, Congress, after several years of prodding on the part of 
the Treasury M inister, approved a law on freedom of contracts 
which established no limits on the in terest to be charged and, 
in the case of non-payment, required auctioned goods to be sold 
for the highest price th a t was offered, w hatever th a t price 
m ight be. On May 2, 1836, Congress established special m er­
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cantile courts in order to hasten  the lethargic legal process. In 
1841 a change in the law on staying private debt (May 5) re­
quired all creditors to agree to any change in the schedule of 
paym ents. If  only one objected, no m atter w hat percentage of 
the debt he held, the debtor's goods would be liable to public 
auction as per the 1834 law. The object of these laws was to of­
fer guarantees to the creditor th a t his money could be recov­
ered in a relatively brief period of time. Both the 1834 and the 
1841 laws were in direct contradiction w ith Spanish custom, 
which tended to be lenient w ith the debtor and which had  left 
foreign m erchants hesitan t to lend money they m ight well have 
difficulties in recovering.5
The other major incentive to a ttrac t foreign capital was the 
recognition and faithful servicing of both the domestic and the 
foreign debt. From the very beginning, Venezuela had been 
paying a portion of the Colombian domestic debt because it was 
charged against Venezuelan revenues. The B ritish bondholders 
began pressing for a settlem ent of the foreign debt as early as 
1832, in p a rt because the domestic debt was being paid (a p a t­
te rn  which would be repeated in the future). However, it was 
made clear to them  th a t any formal discussions would have to 
wait until Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador accorded a division 
of the debt. Such an agreem ent was signed in late 1834 bu t was 
not ratified by the Colombian Congress until 1837. U nder its 
term s, Venezuela was assigned 28 V2 percent of both the domes­
tic and the foreign debt of the Republic of Colombia. In term s of 
the domestic debt, this m eant 7,217,915.12 pesos plus interests. 
By this same date, however, Venezuela had already amortized 
slightly more than  three million pesos. Nevertheless, the ques­
tion of the domestic debt, which had simply been trea ted  as 
Treasury debt until th a t year, became the subject of specific leg­
islation. The May 5, 1837, law established the fram ework for 
the existing Venezuelan debt, its verification, the issuance of 
bonds, in terest paym ents and amortization. I t also created the
5 See H alperin Donghi (1972: chap. 2) for an excellent account of the  difficulties foreign 
m erchants, particularly  the  British, encountered while doing business in the  new 
Latin American nations.
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Public Debt Commission, which would gradually evolve into 
the M inistry of Public Credit in 1864. The laws of April 5, 
1840, and April 27, 1843, extended the 1837 framework to per­
m it the conversion and consolidation of the Colombian debt.6
The foreign debt represented by the Colombian loans of 1822 
and 1824 was by far the largest item in the national debt in the 
early years of the Republic. The government's original instruc­
tions to its negotiator, Alejo Fortique, were to em phasize the 
meager resources of the government and thereby obtain a two- 
th irds reduction in the capital and the condonation of the un ­
paid interests. Under no circumstances was he to allow a hy­
pothecation of any source of revenue as a guarantee of paym ent 
nor undertake obligations which the country would be unable 
to fulfill (Fortique 1962: 10-23). The improvement in the eco­
nomic circumstances of the country while the negotiations were 
taking place m eant th a t the bondholders were not willing to be 
so generous.
The government finally settled the conversion unilaterally  by 
m eans of an executive decree dated September 16, 1840. Vene­
zuela recognized an active debt which am ounted to 
11,802,473.56 pesos and an equal am ount for deferred debt 
(the unpaid interests). After seven years a t two percent, in ter­
est on the active debt would rise by a quarter percent annually 
to six percent and, after a grace period of twelve years, from 
one to five percent on the deferred debt. This m eant th a t Vene­
zuela would make annual paym ents of some 160,000 pesos a 
year for seven years, which coincided nicely w ith the surplus 
produced a t the end of the last fiscal year. Although not 
pleased w ith the term s it felt obligated to accept, the govern­
m ent hoped th a t future budgetary surpluses would perm it the 
am ortization of a significant portion of the debt before the 
ra tes began to rise.7
6 In fact, there  are several other intervening laws bu t these are the m ajor laws which 
established the  initial perm anent categories of debt. They were subsequently pa r­
tially  or completely reformed, but the categories remained.
7 The executive decree was prin ted  in the Exposición que dirije al Congreso de Vene­
zuela en 1841 el Secretario de Hacienda. Henceforth the  annual report will be cited as
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Thus, by 1840 the essential framework of public credit had 
been established and would continue as such throughout the 
period.8 The government punctually serviced both the domestic 
and the foreign loans but its port and ta riff receipts, which 
comprised between 80 to 90 percent of its revenue after the ab­
olition of various taxes, dropped from 2.2 million to 1.8 million 
pesos in the fiscal year 1841-42 and stayed below the la tte r  fig­
ure for the next eleven years. By 1845, the difficulties of m eet­
ing the obligations of the budget caused the governm ent to fall 
back on a traditional tem porary remedy, which was to discount 
the salaries and pensions paid by the Treasury. This was done 
by m eans of a decree of June 2, which fixed the discount a t five 
percent. W hat was unusual and a sign of the disparity  between 
expenditures and revenues, was th a t this was the first time 
th a t the discount had been applied in peacetime. Another indi­
cation of the incipient deficit was the non-am ortization of the 
foreign debt after 1844-45 and the increase in the floating, i. e., 
Treasury debt (see Table 1).
This la st type of debt had priority in paym ent as it comprised 
the budget overruns which by law were to be cancelled in the 
following fiscal year. As a guarantee of paym ent, the creditors 
were usually given Treasury orders to be paid in the custom­
houses, th a t is, before the revenues were sent to the public 
Treasury. Logically, th is procedure dim inished the revenues 
received for distribution to the various m inistries. If the reve­
nues th a t were generated were greater th an  those budgeted 
and those paid on account of the orders, there was no problem. 
If they were not and expenditures were not reduced in compen­
sation, a shortfall resulted. This was then covered by issuing 
more T reasury orders against the customs revenues.
Memoria de Hacienda, Venezuela w ith the appropriate year. The report always refers 
to the previous fiscal year, thus the report for 1841 covers the  fiscal year 1839-40. 
The m inutes of the  secret m eeting of the Government Council on Septem ber 15, 1840, 
to evaluate the  proposed decree were published in the Memoria de Hacienda, Vene­
zuela (1847).
8 See Pim entel y Roth (1974) for a relatively complete listing of Venezuela's public 
credit laws up to 1872. This book is a rep rin t of the text (not the tables) of Resumen  
cronológico de las leyes y  decretos de crédito público de Venezuela, a report he pre­
pared as M inister of Public Credit in 1873.
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Table 1: Venezuela -  Public Debt and Government Revenues, 1830-1870 
(Rounded, in Thousands of Pesos)3
Fiscal Year 
(7/1-6/30)
Treasury
Debtd
Domestic
Debtc
Foreign
Debtd
Total
Debte
Port & Cus­
toms Duties^
Assets & 
Income^
1830-31 1,989 _ n.d. . 738 1,438
1831-32 1,335 - n.d. - 1,157 1,625
1832-33 1,185 - n.d. - 1,161 1,750
1833-34 780 - n.d. - 1,107 1,866
1834-35 713 - n.d. - 1,004 1,441
1835-36 1,583 - n.d. - 1,842 1,318
1836-37 956 - n.d. - 1,150 1,715
1837-38 440 2,750 n.d. 2,750 920 1,590
1838-39 618 3,440 n.d. 3,440 1,225 1,997
1839-40 171 4,554 n.d. 4,554 1,976 2,796
1840-41 136 4,425 23,605 28,030 2,262 5,363
1841-42 165 2,810 23,605 26,415 1,828 6,223
1842-43 143 2,650 20,476 23,126 1,591 6,795
1843-44 199 2,231 20,926 23,157 1,633 6,045
1844-45 159 2,086 20,926 23,012 1,933 6,314
1845-46 192 1,885 20,926 22,821 1,768 5,787
1846-47 323 1,791 20,926 22,717 1,773 5,986
1847-48 729 1,847 20,926 22,773 1,174 4,526
1848-49 1,917 1,903 20,926 22,829 961 4,852
1849-50 1,830 1,900 20,926 22,826 2,290 5,654
1850-51 2,424 2,052 20,926 22,978 2,654 6,360
1851-52 4,101 n.d. 20,926 n.d. 2,986 8,781
1852-53 6,554 3,541 20,926 24,467 2,284 15,341
1853-54 1,333 4,309 20,926 25,235 2,635 7,096
1854-55 6,445 4,257 20,926 25,183 3,003 13,738
1855-56 6,582 4,671 20,926 25,597 3,212 19,403
1856-57 5,860 n.d. n.d. 41,778 n.d. n.d.
1857-58 n.d. 15,859 25,919 n.d. n.d. n.d.
1858-59 6,866 12,488 26,188 38,676 3,251 5,511
1859-60 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1860-61 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1861-62 n.d. 14,186 29,105 43,291 3,228 9,704
1862-63 n.d. 14,695 35,704 50,399 n.d. n.d.
1863-64 n.d. 15,906 35,743 51,649 n.d. n.d.
1864-65 n.d. 15,715 46,159 61,874 6,215 n.d.
1865-66 n.d. 10,995 46,562 57,557 6,336 19,854
1866-67 3,617 13,113 48,228 61,341 n.d. n.d.
1867-68 4,206 14,680 49,894 66,408 2,794 10,640
1868-69 3,613 14,848 51,560 66,408 3,773 12,165
1869-70 n.d. 12,809 51,097 63,906 n.d. n.d.
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a The figures are given in  pesos fuertes which had a value equal to 6.25 pounds sterling 
a t the beginning of the period and 6.5 after about 1850, although the  exchange ra te  
varied slightly seasonally, 
b From 1830 to 1837 the only debt was charged to the T reasury even though it included 
w hat would be classified as domestic debt by the  1837 law. T reasury  debt was not 
budgeted and was paid directly by the  Treasury, 
c The Colombian domestic debt was not classified as such un til 1837. A law of th a t year 
created the  Venezuelan domestic debt and the  Colombian debt was gradually con­
verted. The domestic debt was budgeted and serviced through the  T reasury  Ministry, 
d The Colombian foreign debt was converted into Venezuelan foreign debt in  1840. It 
was budgeted and serviced through the T reasury Ministry, 
e The total debt does not include the T reasury debt because it was a floating debt 
which should be paid w ithin the  next fiscal year, 
f  This category has been isolated because it provided 80 to 90 percent of the cash in­
come of the  nation by 1833-34, when most national in ternal taxes had been abolished, 
g This item corresponds to w hat was term ed "Ingreso." Income here includes all reve­
nues. Assets refer to w hat the general account of the T reasury called "Existencia. 
U sually it consisted of cash in hand, im m ature bills and the value of national proper­
ties but it also included loans and current credits in tim es of fiscal crisis, as can be 
seen increasingly after 1848-49.
Source: Data compiled by the author from the M emoria de Hacienda, Venezuela  
(1830-72) and M em oria de Crédito Publico, Venezuela  (1865-73). The titles vary 
and in some years there is no report.
3. F is su r e s  in  th e  S tru c tu re , 1847-1858
Although elections had been held regularly, the same group of 
men, who have been called the Conservative Oligarchy but who 
can be better characterized as paecistas (followers of José An­
tonio Páez), had been in power since 1830. Two types of opposi­
tion had made themselves felt: those who took up arm s and 
those who agitated in the press, organized parties and partici­
pated in the elections. The first group, sometimes loosely called 
the M ilitary Party, had rebelled in 1830-31 and again between 
1835 and 1838.9 Both these events are reflected in the sudden 
growth of the Treasury debt (see Table 1). The second group be­
9 Francisco Jav ier Yanes wrote in 1835 th a t the m ilitary was consuming h a lf  the  an­
nual revenues and those same men were given to try ing  th e ir hand a t revolution from 
tim e to tim e because there  was no effective sanction if  they lost. (That was because of 
the profound feeling of solidarity among those who had fought together in the  wars 
for independence.) See his "Epístolas C atilinarias,1 in: Pensamiento politico 
venezolano (1961-62,XII: 24-25).
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came more im portant in the early 1840s when they published a 
plethora of newspapers and organized the Liberal Party. They 
were resolved to win their campaign through elections and be­
came im portant forces on the municipal and provincial level 
w ithout gaining entrée to the Congress or national government 
posts. The presidential elections of 1846 looked to be bitterly 
contested and there was a great deal of agitation in various 
parts  of the country. Páez, hoping to avoid arm ed conflict, 
nam ed General José Tadeo Monagas as his candidate, despite 
Monagas' previous participation in the uprisings of 1830-31 
and 1835. He feared th a t Monagas, who had the largest poten­
tial private arm y in Venezuela, would throw his support to the 
Liberals. Uprisings occurred, but w ithout Monagas' participa­
tion since he was the official candidate. Instead of being 
overthrown, the regime changed constitutionally, although 
cries of electoral fraud were heard. The uprisings related  to the 
elections were not completely suppressed, however, until mid- 
1847 (M atthews 1977: chaps. 5-6).
The direct motivation for these uprisings was political. In 
1830 the soldiers who took up arm s did it to protest against the 
dissolution of the Republic of Colombia and to protect their 
rights and privileges. In 1831 the cause was federalism  and the 
formation of a separate sta te  in the eastern  part of the country, 
in which the m ilitary fuero would be recognized and the Catho­
lic religion would be the sta te  religion. When they revolted 
again in 1835, in the G uerra de las Reformas, they wanted 
more respect as the liberators of nearly ha lf a continent. The 
m anner of showing th a t respect would be to increase notably 
the ir participation in public life. This revolt, which m anaged 
tem porarily to overthrow the President, had w hat m ight be 
considered a secondary economic motive. The soldiers resented 
the lim itations placed on the size of the arm y and the letras de 
cuartel. The letras paid one-third salaries to the m any who, as 
a consequence of the reduction in forces, were not on active 
duty. The question of haberes militares had also not been com­
pletely settled. These points were not emphasized, however.
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The rebels w anted to run  the country more th an  they wanted 
economic privileges as such (Gil Fortoul 1967,11: chap. 7; Cas­
tillo Blomquist 1987: chap. 2; Parra-Pérez 1958-60,1).
In the 1840s, although opposition to the government certain­
ly fed on the economic problems of the agricultural sector and 
various liberal economic policies, their first and la st cry was 
"hombres nuevos, principio alternativo."10 W hat united this 
group was the ir exclusion from power. Although th is opposition 
was basically civilian in origin, it attracted  caudillos who were 
looking for a cause and thus it contributed, unintentionally 
perhaps, to some arm ed uprisings (M atthews 1977: chap. 5).
W hen M onagas was elected, the center of power began to 
shift. He was not a follower of Páez, resented his attem pts to 
control him  through the paecista-dom inated Congress and be­
gan building his own power base, mostly among liberals. In 
1848, the Cámara de Diputados resolved to im peach Monagas 
for various infringem ents of the constitution and Monagas in ­
tervened. The exact account of who did w hat to whom first will 
probably never be fully agreed upon, but the resu lt was th a t 
the deputies were attacked by a mob of M onagas1 supporters 
and in the ensuing melee, several congressmen died. This mo­
tivated Páez to take up arm s against the government. The con­
frontations lasted until mid 1849 (Castillo Blomquist 1987: 
chaps. 2-4).
These events have been highlighted because they were the 
im m ediate cause of the ensuing fiscal crisis which would soon 
become chronic. Páez1 rebellion was the greatest th rea t the 
government had yet faced and the time and the cost of putting 
it down reflected that. Although Páez was defeated in mid 1849 
and no other im portant uprisings took place until 1853, a fiscal 
exam ination of these years shows th a t m ilitary and related ex­
10 See Gil Fortoul (1967,11: chap. 9) for an excellent analysis of the origins of the Liber­
al Party. In an extensive footnote, pp. 235-37, he also includes a communication 
from Laureano Vallenilla Lanz on the social basis of the party. Fortoul and Valle- 
nilla's in terpreta tions of the  events of these years have not been effectively chal­
lenged by more recent historians, despite the  bad odor they both are in as exponents 
of positivism.
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penditures comprised an exorbitant percentage of the to tal dis­
bursem ents. Particularly  shocking is th a t the M inistry of the 
Interior, which was responsible for the judicial system, educa­
tion, health  and public works, i.e., the bases for socioeconomic 
progress, accounted for only ten  percent of the expenditures 
(see Table 2).
Table 2\ Venezuela -  Government Expenditures, 1845-46 to 1854-55 
(Rounded, in Thousands of Pesos)
Fiscal
Year
Interior 
& Justice
Treasury Foreign
Affairs
War Navy Others Total
1845-46 706 1,082 17 487 58 _ 2,350
1846-47 683 688 22 1,536 77 658 3,664
1847-48 452 411 9 1,035 172 378 2,457
1848-49 312 315 10 1,614 449 133 2,832
1849-50 458 467 10 1,739 248 489 3,411
1850-51 420 774 13 607 - 1,682 3,496
1851-52 441 884 35 782 123 2,509 4,774
1852-53 394 6,907 37 826 83 3,544 11,792
1853-54 468 1,076 73 1,362 - 1,739 4,718
1854-55 601 1,608 45 2,050 161 6,325 10,790
Total 4,935 14,212 271 12,038 1,371 17,457 50,284
Percent 10 % 28 % - 24 % 3 % 35 % 100%
Source: Data compiled by the author from the Memoria de Hacienda, Venezuela 
(1847-56).
M ilitary expenditures made up a direct 27 percent of the dis­
bursem ents, bu t much of the paym ent for curren t creditors 
found in the category of "Others" is m ilitary-related as well, as 
is a considerable portion of 6.9 million pesos spent by the Treas­
ury in 1852-53. A relatively norm al m ilitary expenditure can 
be seen in the years 1850-51 through 1852-53, bu t it is signifi­
cant th a t a t the same time these expenditures returned  to 
the ir norm al level, the disbursem ents made in the category of
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"Others" increased enormously. This category refers to w ith­
held salaries and pensions, emergency loans and other current 
creditors for financial or m ilitary contracts. As can be seen, af­
te r 1849-50 th is category, which was not budgeted, consumed 
half or more of the expenditures, except in 1852-53, when many 
of these paym ents were made, for some unexplained reason, by 
way of the Treasury M inistry. As was previously mentioned, 
there were no armed outbreaks between mid 1849 and mid 
1853 (notice the jum p in m ilitary expenditures for the  up­
risings in 1853-54) but still a trem endous am ount of money was 
being spent, supposedly to pay the loans and supplem ents 
made while quelling the previous rebellions. Every Treasury 
M inister blamed the disturbances or rebellions of 1846-47 and 
1848-49 for the seemingly chronic fiscal deficits.11
As we shall see, however, the uprisings were only the imme­
diate cause: the methods of financing the costs of quelling them  
soon choked the flow of incoming receipts and short-term  fi­
nancing was used to overcome th a t as well. A closer look a t the 
finances of the period is called for.
The funds for the extraordinary m ilitary disbursem ents were 
obtained in various ways. W ith regard to the 1846-47 uprisings, 
the W ar M inistry spent its own budget and then made ex tra­
ordinary expenditures of a million pesos more. The five percent 
discount of salaries and pensions was already in effect when 
the disturbances began and it was renewed on May 18, 1847. 
The government could also discount the promissory notes given 
by m erchants to cover their customs duties. But the major part 
of the extraordinary funds came from reducing expenditures in 
the m inistries of the Interior (390,692 pesos) and the Treasury 
(462,651 pesos). Since the government claimed to have cash in 
hand a t the beginning of the fiscal year and produced a balance 
a t the end of the 1847-48 fiscal year which showed 2,323,108
11 References can be found in the  Memoria de Hacienda, Venezuela, presented in the 
years 1847-1853, w ith the exception of 1850. As late as 1852 the M inister placed the 
entire blame for the  fiscal crisis on those events, saying th a t "the credit of the  N a­
tion had suffered a m ortal wound" as a result.
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pesos in the ir favor, it m ight have seemed th a t the ex tra­
ordinary outlay would not d isrupt the finances of the nation.
However, an exam ination of the specific item s which com­
prised the T reasury assets as of June 30, 1847, shows th a t hard ­
ly any of them  were liquid and many of them  were simply tra n ­
sitorily passing through the Treasury accounts. In fact, they 
were revenues assigned to specific expenditures which had not 
as yet been effected. The biggest item, national properties, had 
a value of 1.2 million pesos and yet was almost w ithout real val­
ue in the m arketplace (Memoria de Hacienda, Venezuela 1848). 
In any case, to be generous, let us say th a t some 400,000 pesos 
were not covered; the T reasury debt increased by precisely th a t 
am ount w ithin the next fiscal year (1847-48). This electoral 
rebellion, term inated while Monagas was still under the tu te ­
lage of the paecistas, seems to have passed into the accounts 
w ithout em bellishm ents. The next rebellion, th a t of Páez 
against Monagas, would not.
The Páez revolt began a t the end of January , 1848, and Pres­
ident Monagas was authorized on January  27 and March 15, 
1848, to raise first a million and then two million pesos in loans, 
and, significantly, to use up to 50 percent of the ordinary 
im port duties to repay them. He did this by issuing short-term  
Treasury bills. By the end of the next fiscal year the Treasury 
debt had more than  doubled. Unfortunately, a t the same time, 
revenues dropped for the second straigh t year to little more 
th an  half of w hat they had been. This m eant th a t reductions in 
the disbursem ents of other m inistries would not help to close 
the breach because the money simply was not there. Therefore 
not all the T reasury bills could be redeemed as promised, 
which caused them  to lose value even as they were being is­
sued. W hat was redeemed was paid w ith the customs duties, 
reducing even fu rther the am ounts available for budgetary dis­
bursem ents.
In  fact, by 1849 the Treasury was in serious difficulties be­
cause so much revenue was being extracted in the custom hous­
es to repay the loans and incoming receipts were much lower
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as a resu lt of the in ternational crisis of 1847. On April 13, the 
executive was authorized to require im m ediate paym ent of the 
ta riff duties instead perm itting them  to be paid w ith promissory 
notes, or pagai'és. This then obviated the need to discount the 
pagarés. On May 2, 1849, a ten percent surcharge was placed 
on im port duties, and exports, which had been freed of duties 
in 1841, were once again taxed.
The rebellion ended w ith the surrender of Páez in August 
and his subsequent expulsion from the country, but the asphyx­
iation of the Treasury continued. The best indication of the 
government's hand-to-m outh existence w ith regard to funds 
was the increase in the categories of loans and curren t credi­
tors in the general account of the Treasury. In  1847-48 the two 
items totalled only 258,154 pesos, but by the end of the next 
fiscal year the total had risen to 995,066 pesos. M ilitary expend­
itures for the two years were 2.6 million pesos and this, plus 
the million in loans, is the cost of the rebellion. However, this 
million added to the 700,000 pesos of Treasury debt from the 
previous year does not quite equal the new am ount of Treasury 
debt, 1.9 million pesos. By the time Monagas left office, in early 
1851, the to tal had reached 2.4 million pesos. The Treasury 
debt, which he had received a t 729,000 pesos, had trip led .12 
Some 600,000 pesos of th a t increase need an explanation.
The floating debt, which should be cancelled directly out of 
Treasury receipts w ithin the next fiscal year, is the tru es t gage 
of the severity of the financial difficulties of the government. It 
is significant th a t from 1837-38, when the Treasury debt first 
appears as a separate item  from the domestic debt, to the end 
of the paecista  regime in 1846-47, only two years registered a 
tru ly  formidable percentage of Treasury debt w ith relation to 
real income: the two fiscal years th a t w itnessed the uprisings 
of the mid 1830s. In 1837/38-1838/39 the ratio, which usually 
hovered around 10, reached 50 percent. The situation was saved
12 The various item s which constitute this debt can be found in the "Cuenta General 
de la Tesorería," published in the Memoria de Hacienda, Venezuela of the  appro­
priate  year.
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by the 30 percent increase in revenues in 1839-40. The debt 
ratio  rose to 18 percent in the last year of the paecista govern­
m ents because of the 1846-47 uprisings, but this tim e the si­
tuation would not be remedied.
The next two years not only w itnessed a drastic drop in rev­
enue but also the Páez rebellion. It was a t this point th a t the 
floating debt got out of control. The government had given 
some thought to a domestic tax, but lacked the statistical basis 
on which to form ulate it. S trapped for cash, it in itia ted  a series 
of short-term  loans including the emission of Treasury bills 
which, along w ith their interests, were paid out of already in­
adequate revenues. This is the explanation for the "extra" 
600,000 pesos in the total T reasury debt th a t cannot be ex­
plained by extraordinary m ilitary expenditures. The ratio of 
Treasury debt w ith reference to real income in this government 
(1847/48-1850/51) rose: 62 percent; 199 percent; 80 percent; 91 
percent. But the disproportion did not end w ith this regime. It 
continued, despite efforts to convert the Treasury debt into do­
mestic debt which would not put the same onerous charge on 
the customs receipts. Throughout the rest of the period for 
which statistics exist, the ratio, after reaching a high of 287 
percent in 1852-53, stayed between 100 and 200 percent.13
This disproportion continued because the conditions th a t 
made it possible also continued. There were uprisings in 1853- 
54, a revolution in 1858, a civil w ar between 1859 and 1863, 
and continual rebellions for the rest of the 1860s. W arfare, of 
w hatever nature, also caused damages which led to claims 
against the government. Claims, possibly because of difficulties 
in paym ent, tended to be inflated. In the case of foreigners not 
only inflated, but conducive to diplomatic intervention.14 Their
13 In  1853-54 the ratio  was only 51 percent but it seems likely th a t th is was the  result 
of a verification of the  T reasury debt which had not been concluded a t the  end of the 
fiscal year. The next year th is debt retu rned  to its previous heights and stayed 
there, in as far as available statistics show, un til 1866.
14 Several lists of such claims in 1863, including loans of money and goods, which only 
contained claims of those who did not fight on the  losing side in the  civil war, 
am ounted to some 12 million pesos claimed by Venezuelans and 5 million by for­
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claims formed the basis of w hat would eventually be known as 
the Diplomatic Debt, a source of unending problems on the in ­
ternational level (Arcaya 1965).
But the actual cost of these wars and rebellions was only one 
part of the problem. The other part was the m echanisms used 
to finance the extraordinary expenditures. In fact, th is was 
usually done by short-term  loans of an individual nature. The 
ensuing paperwork soon overwhelmed the Treasury section 
and it never recovered. Their work had originally been to re ­
ceive the customs receipts (and other revenues), note the depos­
it in the ir books, and then  transfer them  on to the appropriate 
account. The occasional orders against receipts were handled 
w ithout any difficulty, bu t when these began to num ber in the 
thousands and have specific portions of specific revenues, the 
bookkeeping became extremely sloppy. More im portantly, there 
were lim its as to the definitive reductions which could be made 
in budgeted items. Eventually many of the funds for the essen­
tial items in the budgeted appropriations also had to be financed 
w ith short-term  loans, and thus the Treasury debt grew even 
more. Significantly, although the am ount of this debt was usual­
ly given in the annual report, the budget never included funds 
to pay it.
José Gregorio Monagas, President from 1850 to 1854, had 
seen the T reasury debt increase from 1.8 to 6.6 million in his 
first th ree years in office. The fact th a t there was no money in 
the Treasury when he assumed office led him  to in itia te regu­
lar contracts, w ith a variety of persons, to supply funds. This 
constant short-term  indebtedness was fatal. It produced in ter­
est ra tes th a t varied between 9 and 18 percent per year and 
was payable, often w ith a specific hypothecation, on the customs 
revenues. I t gave rise to the practice of financial speculation, 
agiotismo, which had not been known in Venezuela previously, 
as the government had mostly operated w ithin its norm al rev­
enues. As a consequence of this practice, the operational ability
eigners. The highest claim, 1.5 million pesos, was entered by José Tadeo Monagas 
(Carrillo B atalla  1984 ss.,XVI: 113-133).
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of the Treasury, which could not cope w ith the paperwork, was 
greatly debilitated, leading to negligence, corruption and fraud.
Some of the funds received using th is mechanism were in 
cash, but some were devalued debt instrum ents which were 
handed in a t face value in order to get a treasu ry  order, which 
had a better chance of being redeemed. The Treasury accounts 
of this period reveal th a t the government survived completely 
a t the mercy of its creditors. According to the accounts, they 
loaned as much as eight million pesos in ju s t one year (which 
included devalued paper), a figure which is rem arkable given 
the to tal circulation of money a t th a t time. Being short-term  
transactions, the figure undoubtedly reflected the turnover of 
the funds loaned (Memoria de Hacienda, Venezuela 1852; 1853; 
1854).
In any case, despite surcharges on ta riff duties, there  was not 
enough money in the customhouses to redeem all the Treasury 
orders. Therefore, some holders would sell them  at a discount 
for cash. The usual buyers were the im port m erchants, who 
having paid 20 to 30 percent for the order, would then  hand it 
in a t nearly  full face value in partial paym ent of the duties on 
the ir m erchandise (Berglund 1985: 381). The m erchant profited 
by paying less than  full value for the duties he owed, bu t the 
government suffered because the transaction was once again 
made in part w ith paper when it needed the full value in cash. 
The confusion caused by the m ultiplication of these vales led to 
the prom ulgation of the law of April 18, 1853, which fused all 
the Treasury debt th a t had accumulated between Ju ly  1, 1846, 
and June 30, 1852, ceding one-fourth of all ordinary import 
duties to its redemption.
The fusion of debts was exactly w hat was needed to keep the 
accounts straight, but it was José Gregorio's only effort in th a t 
direction. In his farewell message to Congress in 1854, Monagas 
made the point th a t in no country in the world are extraordina­
ry expenditures, such as those for war, covered by ordinary 
revenues. R ather, those expenses are covered by different 
sources, leaving the norm al income of the country to cover
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budgeted expenses. For th a t reason, he had actively sought for­
eign funding to relieve the burden of the debts charged to the 
customhouses so as to leave these receipts for norm al ex­
penditures. His efforts to reduce the actual foreign debt service 
and to obtain another loan had not been successful (Mensajes 
presidenciales, Venezuela 1970,1: 199).
When José Tadeo Monagas became President again in 1855, 
he found the Treasury completely disorganized and unable to 
cope any longer. In his first message to Congress, he stated: 
"Our Treasury, our accounting, our credit are in chaos" (M en­
sajes presidenciales, Venezuela 1970,1: 211). One of his initial 
acts was to create a firm fiscal basis for public credit, which he 
achieved by m eans of the May 22, 1855 law, regulated on No­
vember 30. This law destined up to 40 percent of the ordinary 
customs revenues to the servicing and am ortization of the 
Treasury, domestic, and foreign debt, as well as the paym ent of 
diplomatic claims. He was aware th a t the public adm inistration 
would have financial difficulties w ith so much revenue effec­
tively lost, but he assumed th a t it would be easier and cheaper 
to borrow money if the nation's credit was on a sound fiscal 
basis. To free up the Treasury, the new law called for the con­
solidation of all T reasury debt verified between Ju ly  1, 1846, 
and June 30, 1855, which would be converted into Treasury 
debt w ithout interest. Only the Stay Law debt payable through 
the T reasury with five percent in terest and the existing five per­
cent T reasury debt were excepted. The diplomatic claims would 
receive 250,000 pesos a year, the 1851-1854 contracts would re ­
ceive 120,000 pesos and the special contracts for public works 
would receive 60,000 pesos per year. The Treasury debt w ithout 
in terest (which totalled some three million pesos) would be 
amortized a t the ra te  of 5,000 pesos per month. The lack of in te r­
est on w hat were supposedly short-term  cash loans and the rel­
atively long w ait (possibly fifty years) for paym ent were strong 
indications of its often spurious nature. Finally, the domestic 
debt would be serviced and amortized regularly, and the un ­
paid in terests would be cancelled. All the term s of th is new law
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were m et religiously while M onagas was in power (Pimentel y 
Roth 1974: 54-57).
According to the report of the Treasury M inister in 1856, the 
government was quite aware th a t customs receipts varied sea­
sonally. In order to assure an even flow so as to fulfill its credit 
obligations punctually and perm it rational planning of dis­
bursem ents, it signed a contract w ith the Compañía de Accio­
nistas. The company, formed for the purpose, was composed of 
individual speculators and several commercial firms. The 
term s of the two-year contract were to establish a current ac­
count for the government a t a ra te  of 3/4 percent a m onth (the 
legal ra te  since 1849 when the law on freedom of contracts was 
repealed) and a five percent commission for the collection and 
transferra l of funds from various customhouses. The company 
had the responsibility of paying the diplomatic claims and the 
in terest on the domestic debt as well as the norm al adm inis­
trative expenditures of the government. It was given all of the 
customs duties a t La G uaira and 35 percent of those in four 
other ports. In essence, this was the old contract system cen­
tralized in ju s t one institution. The Treasury M inister noted 
th a t it was true  th a t th is arrangem ent had its costs, bu t tha t 
the old system did not work and if this did, it was well worth 
the added expense. The company failed in 1857 because the 
government made expenditures which were not subsequently 
recoverable by the revenues available.
On Septem ber 20, 1856, Congress authorized the executive 
branch to reform the public credit law and restructu re the Treas­
ury M inistry. In decrees dated between October 15 and 24, the 
executive enacted a radical reform of the Treasury M inistry and 
on December 16, it decreed the first thorough reform of the cred­
it law.
Having saved both the Treasury and the M inistry, on paper 
a t least, Monagas proceeded to try  to save the presidency for 
himself. The 1857 Congress approved a new constitution 
(though it was unconstitutional to do so in th a t m anner) which, 
among other changes, amplified executive powers, sanctioned
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consecutive presidential term s and extended those term s from 
four to six years. It then  elected Monagas to a fu rther six-year 
term. This was the step th a t united his opposition and he was 
overthrown on March 15, 1858.
4. F isc a l C o lla p se , 1858-1870
One of the first acts (March 27, 1858) of the provisional chief 
executive was to create a commission to verify the accounts in 
all the offices of the Treasury from 1851 to 1858.15 Although 
the commission began work, it was replaced w ithin a year by 
another commission which would restric t itse lf to verifying pub­
lic debt docum ents.16 The Verification Commission produced its 
first report in January  1860, giving the results noted in Table 1 
for the years 1856/58-1858/59.17 As can be seen, the Treasury
15 His justification was the  prevalent adm inistrative disorder and the  fact th a t the pub­
lic debt had grown so much th a t it constituted a th rea t to the fu ture  of the country. 
In case there  was any doubt about crim inal liability in this situation, art. 6 prohib­
ited those who had been high officials of the  executive branch and all T reasury offi­
cials from alienating property, personal or real, until the commission finished its in ­
vestigation.
16 Once again there  would be no sanctions for wrongdoing. In a communication by 
Francisco de P. Pardo to the Verification Commission on November 18, 1859, the rea ­
sons are made clear. He sta tes th a t although the  fraud in the accounts is palpable, 
the accounts were legally closed by the  rightful authorities of the nation a t the time. 
To dispute them  would be to underm ine public faith, the sanctity  of contracts, the 
m eaning of forms, and imply th a t nothing ever has an end. If  each new government 
began to dispute the accounts of the  previous one, nothing would ever get done. More 
to the point perhaps, the author suggested th a t so m any in terests were involved, it 
would be impolitic to do anything about it (Carrillo B atalla 1984 ss.,XII: 186-195). 
Another reason for stopping the work, according to the M inister, was th a t it would 
take more tim e to revise the accounts th an  it had taken to perform the transactions 
originally (Memoria de Hacienda, Venezuela 1860).
17 The original 1858 report was not prin ted  before the government was overthrown. 
The new government's 1858 report s ta rts  by indicating th a t the  notorious disorder, 
confusion and crim inal trafficking w ith the  public funds have made it impossible to 
prepare a complete and reliable report. There was no report in 1859. The 1861 re­
port is incomplete because there had not been tim e to a ttend to the  M inistry's reor­
ganization due to the war; the  statistical information is lacking w ith which to make 
the report. In 1862 there  was no Congress so there  was no report; in 1863 the  new 
government had ju s t  come into power and the  report was incomplete; there  was no 
report in 1864, 1868 or 1870. From 1861 to 1867 it was evidently impossible to de­
term ine the  am ount of T reasury debt.
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debt rose a million pesos because the government had been 
fighting a civil w ar for the last year, w ith no end in sight. Even 
before the statistics were available, however, the government 
knew th a t it had no money, despite having had recourse to all 
the usual remedies for fiscal deficits: discounting salaries and 
pensions, adding surcharges to the customs duties, and dis­
counting pagarés. It even imposed a fixed extraordinary con­
tribution, based on income, on all activities except agriculture.
Hoping to avoid the problems th a t penny-ante thinking 
would precipitate, the government, which had no domestic cred­
it to speak of, decided to launch a one million peso emission of 
paper in October 1859. It was to pay one and a ha lf percent a 
m onth in in terests and be redeemed in 20 months, guaranteed 
by a 50 percent mortgage on the aduana  receipts a t La G uaira 
and Puerto Cabello. So far it was not a believable proposition 
because there were still bills floating around which belonged to 
the emissions of 1848 and 1849. W hat sold this issue was tha t 
the governm ent managed to get the leading m ercantile houses 
to subscribe it and redeem it. At th a t point in tim e the houses 
had much better credit, both financial and moral, than  the gov­
ernm ent did. And since they were all im porters or exporters, it 
was easy for them  to supervise the redem ption of their bills 
(Carrillo B atalla 1984 ss.,XIII: 188-193).
B ut it was not an operation which could be repeated on the 
same scale, as a second issue of A ugust 20, 1860, dem onstra­
ted. The m ercantile houses did not have the liquidity necessary 
to tie up such an am ount for such a relatively long time. Having 
already divined this, the government decided to take up the 
course suggested years before by José Gregorio Monagas: a for­
eign loan.
The original foreign debt, inherited from the independence 
period, had been renegotiated in 1840. Nevertheless, am ortiza­
tion was suspended in 1844, thus putting an end to the hope of 
significantly reducing the debt before the in terest ra tes began 
climbing in 1848. Contemplating the schedule of payments, 
printed in the Memoria de Hacienda of 1847, it became obvious
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th a t the debt, in the context of the fiscal difficulties of the 
country, would have to be renegotiated. The 1847 failure of the 
London house of Reid, Irving and Company, fiscal agents of 
Venezuela, w ith part of the October rem ittances in hand, simply 
precipitated the inevitable. The government was unable to re ­
place the funds or make the next paym ent because of the Páez 
rebellion.
On May 22, 1848, a t the behest of the executive, Congress 
authorized it to renegotiate the loan a t a fixed ra te  of four per­
cent. The government, absorbed in the rebellion, made no con­
tact w ith the bondholders until October 1849. On October 1 an 
executive decree had been published ordering th a t one quarter 
of the ordinary im port duties be used to satisfy the obligations 
of the domestic and the foreign debt (Memoria de Hacienda, 
Venezuela 1850). With this guarantee of paym ent, the govern­
m ent w anted to resum e paym ents w ith some kind of ad just­
ment. The negotiations continued sporadically for the next ten 
years.
A prelim inary agreem ent was reached in September, 1851, 
but was never ratified by Congress because it contained no re ­
duction of the am ount of the debt or the in terest ra te  {Memoria 
de Hacienda, Venezuela 1852). In 1852 the government nam ed 
Frederick H uth  and Company as its fiscal agent, but no rem it­
tances were made. In 1853 the B ritish bondholders sent a Mr. 
Weiss to Caracas, but he arrived in the middle of yet another 
uprising. In a communication to him from the Treasury M inis­
ter, dated June 18, 1853, the M inister noted th a t for the th ird  
time since 1848 the government had enjoined the struggle w ith 
the "enemies of public tranquility" and for th a t reason it was 
not possible to consider any propositions on the foreign debt. 
Mr. Weiss replied th a t the government would undoubtedly 
have the sym pathy of the bondholders on th a t account, but 
th a t they would not and did not understand why even the 
periods of peace which Venezuela had enjoyed produced no 
benefits to the bondholders. John D. Powles, vice-chairm an of 
the Committee of Bondholders, went even fu rther in a sub­
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sequent le tte r to the E arl of Clarendon, dated Ju ly  14, 1853, in 
which he characterized the nonpaym ent of the foreign debt as a 
product of evasions and violations. He also noted th a t a t the 
same tim e the in terest on the domestic debt, secured on the 
same revenues, was punctually paid. "No Government could 
have given its Foreign Creditors more solemn and repeated 
guarantees...or more entirely disregarded and violated them, 
than  has the Government of Venezuela." The country's repu ta­
tion as a bad faith  debtor became official.18
The negotiations continued and another prelim inary agree­
m ent was signed in 1857 which included capitalizing the un ­
paid in terests w ith in terests a t three percent for five years and 
then a t four percent; the active debt to have in terests a t three 
percent and then  four, and the deferred debt to have interests 
a t one percent, then one and a quarter after five years, rising 
to two percent in ten years. The agreem ent was never ratified 
by Congress, which essentially said th a t by the May 10, 1854 
decree it had left the term s in the hands of the executive 
branch. The executive then proposed in terest ra tes of 2-2 V2 and 
3 percent on the capitalized in terests and active bonds and 1-1 Vi 
and 2 percent for the deferred stock. The bondholders viewed 
this as a breach of the original agreem ent w ith the Venezuelan 
commissioners and turned  it down. Aside from any genuine 
sense th a t the in terest ra tes proposed by the bondholders were 
too high for Venezuela to pay, the executive had been counting 
on a five million peso loan to clear up the Treasury debt and 
w ithout it, would not have had the customs duties sufficiently 
clear to guarantee payment. The new loan was never officially 
discussed.19
When José Tadeo Monagas fell, the bondholders again sent 
an agent to open negotiations, bu t the new government was con­
cerned w ith rew riting the constitution. In 1859, however, it 
opened negotiations in London and w ithin a few months, with
18 Report on Foreign Debt o f Venezuela (1854: 18-19, 21-22).
19 See Foreign Debt o f Venezuela (1857).
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the assistance of Baring Brothers and Company, renegotiated 
the debt, capitalizing the unpaid in terests but lowering the 
in terest ra tes  in line w ith w hat the government had asked in 
1858, th a t is, a perm anent ra te  after 1860 of three percent on 
the first two categories and 1 V2 for the deferred. The govern­
m ent made the 1859 and 1860 paym ents and then  defaulted 
again. The civil w ar was in its th ird  year and the government 
needed the funds.
In 1861, after having worked out an arrangem ent w ith the 
recently founded Banco de Venezuela to handle its cash flows, 
and guaranteeing its transactions with 38 percent of the cus­
toms duties a t La G uaira (an arrangem ent somewhat sim ilar 
to th a t established in 1855 w ith the Compañía de Accionistas), 
the government decided to attem pt another foreign loan. The 
bank was having difficulties in obtaining revenues in cash be­
cause of the m any obligations on the duties and it could not 
loan the necessary funds for w ar expenditures. The 
government had continued with a series of sm aller loans, but 
the resu lts were less and less productive and the customs 
duties increasingly bespoken. Thus, the new loan, although 
needed urgently to fight the war, was promoted on the basis of 
freeing up the customs duties in order to promote fiscal sound­
ness. I t was also eventually tied to the paym ent of the old Co­
lombian loans and guaranteed by 55 percent of the im port du­
ties a t La G uaira and Puerto Cabello. The loan was issued by 
Baring Brothers and Company in 1862 for one million pounds 
sterling, a t a price of £ 63 for every £ 100 worth of bonds. Its 
in terest ra te  was six percent and the in terests unpaid since 
1860 were capitalized a t par, also w ith an in terest ra te  of six 
percent.20
20 A Venezuelan account of th is loan can be found in the  publication of m uch of the 
correspondence between the General Secretary and Venezuela's comm issioner,print­
ed in response to criticisms of fraud and corruption after the  government fell. I t  was 
originally published in the new spaper El Independiente (Caracas, 1863), nos. 964- 
976 and reprin ted  in Carrillo B atalla (1984 ss., XIV: 23-114). More information is 
available in  documents published after the  loan paym ents were suspended in late 
1864. See Venezuela Loan  (1865a; 1865b) and Debt o f Venezuela (1865).
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Soon afterw ard the government realized th a t these funds 
were not sufficient for their needs. The Secretary General be­
gan planning a new loan, which was being discussed when the 
government fell in April 1863. The new government, w ith its 
own debts pending and no money, decided to continue negotia­
tions, bu t w ith another institution, the General Credit and Fi­
nance Company. I t arranged a loan in 1864 for £ 1.5 million at 
60 w ith six percent interest, w ith paym ent guaranteed by a hy­
pothecation of the export duties in the four leading ports. U n­
fortunately, either Venezuela had exhausted its credit w ith the 
last loan or the m arket was not buoyant. Only about £ 400,000 
of bonds were actually bought by the public. The Venezuelan 
commissioner of the loan, Antonio Guzmán Blanco, had been 
the M inister of Foreign Affairs and of the Treasury before 
leaving for London and would be elected Vice-President upon 
his return . His decision to go forward w ith the loan, despite the 
poor showing, was based on political criteria and personal gain. 
(Guzmán Blanco was entitled to a commission on the nominal 
value of the loan.) He used the unsold bonds to guarantee 
separate transactions (at the ruinous ra tes of 35-40 percent, to 
which the real value of the bonds dropped alm ost imme­
diately). Although this loan had been promoted as a fiscal loan, 
as in the case of the 1862 loan, its raison d'étre was political -  
the survival of the government. The supporters of the govern­
m ent m ust be recompensed, evidently a t any cost.21
The funds from the 1864 loan were paid out in October and 
the paym ents on the 1862 loan (including the original Colom­
bian loans) were suspended in December. The pretext given by 
the government was th a t the customs duties had not been 
cleared by the funds from the loan and therefore the 55 percent 
hypothecation on them, if not the loan itself, was invalid. But it 
was willing to pay 15 percent of the im port duties in all of the
21 The agent sent to Venezuela to ensure th a t the  export duties were free of encum­
brances wrote a  book on his travels and the loan. See Eastw ick (1959: chap. 14, app. 
A). Many of the  letters from the  General Credit and Finance Company to Guzmán 
Blanco can be found under its name in the Archivo de Guzmán Blanco, in the Fun­
dación Boulton, Caracas.
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ports. This sparked off the controversy detailed in the works cit­
ed in footnote twenty. In April of 1867, paym ents were sus­
pended on the 1864 loan. Although the excuse given was th a t it 
was not correct to pay one loan and not the other, the tru th  
was th a t the government needed the funds. Another rebellion 
had begun.
In 1868, the government, having changed hands again a t the 
cost of new indebtedness, m aintained a hand-to-m outh exis­
tence, contracting loans w ith whomever would offer. N everthe­
less, on May 18, 1869, it abolished the export duties altogether 
as a form of relief to the agricultural sector, hard  h it after so 
many years of warfare. The extraordinary im port duties were 
also reduced as a relief to commerce and to lower prices. At the 
same tim e it was impossible for the national government to 
create domestic taxes because the economy was in shambles 
and the federalism  ram pant in the country gave states the 
right to create their own taxes, which they did. The taxpayers 
were overburdened.
Marcos Santana, a respected m erchant and Treasury M inis­
te r a t the tim e of the 1869 report, noted th a t years of w arfare 
and years of adm inistrative disorder had practically destroyed 
the M inistry and the national Treasury. Congress constantly 
approved budgets above revenues. The Treasury debt alone 
was nearly equal to total income. In terests on the foreign debt 
for the next fiscal year, if they were being paid, and they were 
not, would am ount to 1.7 million pesos and the domestic debt 
in terests to 607,000 pesos. T hat is, in terest on debt obligations, 
if paid, would consume 52 percent of the projected revenues.
It is im portant to note here th a t although revenues had  in ­
creased by about 75 percent since 1840, the (projected) debt 
service had  increased by nearly 600 percent. The ten  M inisters 
who passed through the Treasury M inistry in 1869 seemed to 
stay only long enough to throw up their hands. I t m ight not be 
far from the tru th  to say th a t this government fell in April 
1870 not because Antonio Guzmán Blanco defeated it in battle, 
but from fiscal exhaustion.
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5. C o n c lu s io n s
As the organization of this paper indicates, there seem to be 
three discernible stages in the evolution of Venezuelan debt. In 
the first stage, from 1830 to 1846, the government was basically 
concerned to create the necessary adm inistrative structures 
and to establish and m aintain  public credit. This goal was 
achieved, but the paecista governments were so fiscally conser­
vative th a t they never really contemplated using the ir newly 
acquired credit to create a domestic debt mechanism th a t would 
facilitate funds in the case of an emergency or th a t could be 
used to finance improvements in the infrastructure. If  the gov­
ernm ent had used its newly established credit to float bond is­
sues to build roads, for example, it is quite likely th a t the agri­
cultural sector would have been much more profitable. Expand­
ed communications would have developed a sense of progress 
and nationhood and perhaps the dynamism th a t this would 
have im parted would have turned political dissenters into 
supporters. But perhaps not.
W hat had been an occasional problem before 1845 became 
increasingly more significant afterw ard -  social un rest and a r­
med rebellions. In the absence of an established alternative, 
the costs of suppressing these uprisings were charged to cur­
ren t revenues. As the second stage showed, the years from 
1847 to 1858 were characterized by a loss of control over the 
floating debt. The government began to depend on agiotistas to 
supply it w ith  funds which created a debt cycle of such dimen­
sions th a t the only way of breaking it would have required ex­
ternal funding. Although not unaw are of this possible solution, 
José Tadeo Monagas preferred to try  home remedies first. He 
completely reformed the adm inistrative structure of the Treas­
ury M inistry and the Treasury itself and then rewrote the pub­
lic credit law in the hope th a t it would restore confidence in the 
government's ability to manage the debt. Perhaps w ith suffi­
cient time these reforms would have had the desired effect, but
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Monagas overreached him self politically and was overthrown 
fifteen m onths later.
At the beginning of the th ird  stage, 1858-1870, the combined 
domestic and Treasury debt were almost the same am ount as 
the foreign debt. D esperately short of cash and w ith government 
credit severely questioned, the only large loan which could be 
arranged locally depended on the good will of the m ercantile 
houses. The term s of the loan clearly indicated the lim ited n a­
ture of local credit: in terests a t 1.5 percent a month, redem ption 
in 20 months, and s  fifty percent hypothecation of im port du­
ties. W ith a civil w ar in progress, almost ha lf of its revenues 
pledged and domestic loans available only on prohibitive term s, 
the government decided to re-establish its in ternational credit 
and seek a foreign loan. The existing loan was renegotiated and 
a new loan was eventually forthcoming, but it fell short of the 
needs of the government. It did not adequately reduce the float­
ing debt and did not provide sufficient funds to win the war. 
The new government also negotiated a foreign loan which proved 
to be insufficient for its purposes. Paym ents were soon suspend­
ed on all the foreign debt. During a period of forty years, Vene­
zuela had serviced the foreign debt for only sixteen years.
By 1864 the gam ut of lending possibilities had been exhaust­
ed. By 1867 Venezuela's credit, both domestic and in ternation­
al, was in ruins. The situation had come full cycle since 1830. 
W ith nothing to show for its burden, the national debt had 
more than  doubled. The politics of exclusion had led to arm ed 
rebellion, and inappropriate funding mechanisms had converted 
the ensuing extraordinary expenditures into a perm anent and 
direct burden on the national Treasury. The floating debt thus 
created fed on itself, and eventually destroyed the fiscal sound­
ness of the country. Fiscal control had been lost and the political 
will to regain it was absent. The challenge facing Antonio Guz- 
m án Blanco when he took power in 1870 was to correct th a t 
situation. It was the same challenge th a t the first government 
of the new nation had faced in 1830, but the odds against his 
success were much greater.
